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Chapter 5
Surveillance as governance
Social inequality and the pursuit of
democratic surveillance
Torin Monahan
Technological surveillance is often criticized as being antithetical to demo-
cratic principles, and with good reason. At its core, surveillance is about con-
trol; it tends to produce conditions of constraint, wherein human and technical
action is regulated and limited. The degree and kind of constraint vary
according to the values and assumptions that are embedded in respective sur-
veillance apparatuses and generated by surveillance practices. Although control
could be exercised with surveillance systems for purposes of care or protection,
such systems are most often characterized by coercion and repression, and
offer few avenues for accountability or oversight. Airport security systems, for
example, require people to submit to elaborate surveillance rituals of con-
formity and exposure, making people more open to external scrutiny and
manipulation even while the rights of citizens and others are left intentionally
vague. Commercial surveillance of people for marketing purposes betrays
a similar trend: it encourages (or requires) people to reveal their shopping
preferences and habits so that companies can target their products more prof-
itably or sell their customer data to others; meanwhile, individuals know little
about what data are being collected about them, by whom, or for what pur-
poses. Similarly, state surveillance of those accessing social services, such as
welfare, has become much more fine-grained since automated data systems
have been implemented to distribute and manage “benefits;” at the same time,
the disclosure of information to welfare recipients about how their data are
used or even about policies for disciplining or rewarding recipients based on
their spending habits has been restricted.
These disparate examples, which represent commonplace rather than
exceptional surveillance practices, share a set of characteristics that are clearly
non-democratic. They each open people up to examination and control, while
constraining individual autonomy. They each rely upon opacity instead of
transparency; most people under surveillance have little knowledge of the
inner workings of the systems or their rights as citizens, consumers, or others.
Finally, because these systems are closed, they resist opportunities for demo-
cratic participation in how they are designed, used, critiqued or regulated.
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In this paper, I argue that the underlying conditions of most contemporary
surveillance systems run counter to principles of democratic governance. First,
I draw upon writings from the field of technology studies that deal with
democracy and technology to frame technologies, including those of surveil-
lance, as political in their own right, apart from how they are used by gov-
ernment agencies, corporations, or others. Second, I analyze the dominant
functions of surveillance today with regard to the differential treatment and
automated control of populations, functions which both produce marginal
identities and resist democratic participation or oversight. Finally, to avoid
deterministic conclusions about surveillance, I explore several examples of
democratically empowering surveillance systems that encourage openness,
transparency, accountability, participation, and power equalization among
social groups and institutions.
Technology and democracy
Inquiry into the relationship between surveillance and democracy can fruitfully
begin by recognizing the non-democratic character of most technological sys-
tems. Following from John Dewey, I understand democracy to be much “more
than a form of government”—as a mode of associated living predicated upon
conditions of social equality, along lines of race, class, gender, and other
categories of difference (Dewey, 1916:87). At least since the Enlightenment,
technologies have been wrapped up in a mythology of social progress, which
frames any new advancement as an unqualified good (Adas, 1989). Seldom have
people stopped to ask the crucial question of what kind of progress is being
achieved by new technological systems (Marx, 1997). Social progress could be
measured in terms of personal satisfaction, educational achievement, environ-
mental sustainability, access to health care, strong community ties, reduced
economic inequality, and so on. Instead, in most circles progress has come to
be synonymous with greater technical efficiency or economic gain.
Science and technology studies (STS) scholars, at least those in the norma-
tive branch of this field, have argued that democratic design processes and
outcomes should be the primary criteria for evaluating technological systems
and deciding upon their social worth (Winner, 1986; Sclove, 1995; Martin, 1999;
Woodhouse et al., 2002). The rationale for this position is that because of the
exclusionary nature of the design of most technologies, technological systems
tend to overlook the needs of diverse populations, force homogenization and
adaption, and produce a series of so-called externalities—from toxic waste to
energy dependency—for which people and institutions must take responsi-
bility. By increasing public participation in the process of technology design
and evaluation, we could at the very least circumvent some of the most
destructive outcomes of new systems. Even better, such systems could
empower citizens by including them in the process, recognizing their tacit
expertise, and cultivating new knowledge about the merits of some technologies
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over others. Finally, involving more people in what is typically seen as the
domain of technical experts could speed up feedback loops so that problems
could be identified and corrected sooner, preferably before large-scale infra-
structural investments have been made (Woodhouse and Nieusma, 2001).
The democratization of technology sounds radical, in part, because of the
presumed impracticality of public involvement. It is probably not a coin-
cidence that as the scale and scope of technological mediation increases,
meaningful democratic participation in most aspects of governance decreases
(Winner, 1977). There are productive counter-examples to this trend, of course,
as with the formation of new social movements (Juris, 2008; Hess, 2007) or
participation in formal politics over the internet (Ratcliffe and Lebkowsky,
2005). Nonetheless, the public is generally excluded from active participation
in most matters considered technical, from transportation to city planning,
from energy resources to military weaponry, from food production to com-
munication networks. At least in the United States, public involvement in
decisions about technological systems has been restricted to consumer choices,
occasional ballot measures, and infrequent—and largely symbolic—public
meetings. The infeasibility of public involvement has been partially condi-
tioned by the closed technological systems upon which people depend.
If democratic participation is an unfamiliar and unsupported activity
throughout most aspects of people’s everyday lives, it should not be surprising
that the prospect of greater participation in decisions about technology might
sound absurd.
An important analytical step toward democratizing technology is recogniz-
ing the political nature and social agency of all technologies. As Langdon
Winner writes: “Far from being merely neutral, our technologies provide a
positive content to the arena of life in which they are applied, enhancing cer-
tain ends, denying or even destroying others” (Winner, 1977: 29). Much like
legislation, technological systems provide a set of rules, or scripts, encouraging
certain uses or interactions and discouraging others (Winner, 1986; Akrich,
1992; Lessig, 1999). For example, video cameras lend themselves to the remote
observation of others; highways lend themselves to vehicular transportation;
walls and gates lend themselves to the regulation of belonging. The scripts of
technological systems partially determine social practices by exerting agential
force upon people and contexts. Moreover, technological systems introduce a
series of dependencies—such as those upon electricity, data networks, or
security systems—that require institutional commitments for the systems to
continue to operate. Because technologies frame what is possible and practical
for people and organizations, they can be said to be “political,” even though
decisions about them are seldom made through democratic processes. This
neither denies the agency of people nor depends upon a simplistic belief in
technological determinism. Instead, it sets the stage for a critical reading
of technology in society, including an analysis of the role of technology in
instituting and maintaining non-democratic practices and social inequalities.
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By pulling technologies into the realm of the political, one can subject them
to critical analysis and debate. Richard Sclove proposes, for example, that all
technological systems be assessed with strong democratic principles in mind in
order to mitigate the dominant non-democratic trajectory of most systems.
He explains this position with a simple but persuasive syllogism:
Insofar as (1) citizens ought to be empowered to participate in shaping
their society’s basic circumstances and (2) technologies profoundly affect
and partly constitute those circumstances, it follows that (3) technological
design and practice should be democratized.
(Sclove, 1995:ix)
To the extent that people value ideals of democratic governance, it is logical
that they should embrace the democratization of the technological systems that
increasingly shape all aspects of life and act as social structures in their own
right. It is important to note, however, that this does not imply eliminating
technical experts or political representatives but instead further including
technological decisions in policy-making processes. Sclove elaborates:
The strong democratic ideal envisions extensive opportunities for citizens
to participate in important decisions that affect them. A decision qualifies
as important particularly insofar as it bears on a society’s basic organiza-
tion or structure. The commitment to egalitarian participation does not
preclude continued reliance on some representative institutions, but these
should be designed to support and incorporate, rather than to replace,
participatory processes.
(Sclove, 1995: 26)
The mechanisms for such participation can vary, from full-scale participatory
design processes—where citizens collectively decide what kind of technologies
they need and involve themselves in their production—to citizen consensus
conferences or review panels for evaluating proposed or existing technologies.
These processes can accommodate either direct or representative forms of
democratic participation. Participatory design has proven to be a successful
approach for designing spaces, technologies, and systems in meaningful colla-
boration with occupants or users (Schuler and Namioka, 1993). A key tenet of
participatory design is that all users are experts in what they do, and designers
can tap this expertise to generate better and more democratic outcomes
(Howard, 2004). A less robust but more prevalent form of public involvement
in technology design is the practice of “user-centered design” (Nieusma, 2004;
Norman, 1988), which focuses on the needs or preferences of users and can be
seen, for instance, with the widespread practice of beta-testing for computer
software. At the very least, regulatory boards or government agencies could be
established to investigate the social, environmental, and economic impacts
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(or implications) of new technologies and make those findings available to
policy-makers and the public. The United States Office of Technology
Assessment, which was dissolved in 1995, serves as an important precedent
and a possible form for establishing future governmental bodies devoted to
technology assessment.
Apart from this focus on the largely absent but necessary democratic pro-
cesses for technology production and evaluation, there remains the question of
what kinds of technological systems are inherently more democratic by design.
Ivan Illich (1973) introduces the generative concept of conviviality to describe
technologies of community and self-empowerment that exist in opposition to
the hegemony of industrial modes of production, which he perceives to be
anti-democratic in nature. Convivial technologies are those that encourage
self-sufficiency, local autonomy, community building, and self-actualization.
Possible examples might be community-based solar power systems (Nieusma,
2007) or water pumps that are easy to install, operate, and fix (de Laet and
Mol, 2000). By definition, convivial technologies are small-scale, transparent,
accessible, and easy to use and/or modify.
Whereas most large-scale technological systems, including those for surveil-
lance, are relatively closed and difficult to alter, convivial technologies possess
a property that might be called structural flexibility, meaning that they not
only afford but also invite modification on the part of users, support diverse
modes of expression, and enable power equalization among people (Monahan,
2005). For instance, elements of structural flexibility can be seen with internet
sites such as Indymedia, which allows users to post their own news stories, or
with certain decentralized educational settings that support student explora-
tion and collaboration on inquiry-driven projects (Monahan, 2005). Structural
flexibility, as an ideal, does not deny the value of standardization but instead
encourages continually revisiting categories and standards to determine which
are most appropriate and least exclusionary for any given situation. Although
such technological systems are all too rare, their presence provides a valuable
alternative position from which to probe the democratic potentials and threats
of contemporary technological surveillance.
Surveillance as control
It is now widely recognized that the emergence of information systems and
shifts in modes of capital accumulation, especially since the 1970s, have
brought about an increasingly globalized information or network society
(Harvey, 1990; Castells, 1996; Hardt and Negri, 2000). Information and com-
munication technologies now mediate and govern most domains of life, espe-
cially in industrialized countries. What is seldom noted, however, is that
information societies are perforce surveillance societies (Giddens, 1990; Lyon,
2001). The orientation of information systems is toward data creation, collec-
tion, and analysis for the purposes of intervention and control. Surveillance
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societies have deep roots in the modern bureaucratic project of rational,
scientific management of organizations and populations, which is itself a
powerful iteration of the Enlightenment belief in scientific and technological
progress (Porter 1995). The popular motif of Big Brother, or state-run
surveillance operations, however, fails to account for the almost complete
integration of information systems, and therefore surveillance functions.
David Lyon elucidates:
surveillance societies are such in the sense that surveillance is pervasive in
every sector of societal life, courtesy of an integrated information infra-
structure. Far from state surveillance being predominate, surveillance
activities may now be found in work situations and consumer contexts as
well. … Moreover, surveillance data is networked between these different
sectors, to create degrees of integration of surveillance systems undreamed
of in the worst Orwellian nightmare, but with actual social effects that are
far more ambiguous and complex.
(Lyon, 2001:34–35)
Concern for democracy, therefore, must attend to the state but also
extend beyond it to question all the modes of information-facilitated control—
it must look to the extreme and the mundane, from state spying programs
to targeted consumer marketing, for instance. Whereas the previous section
of this paper stressed non-democratic trends in relation to technologies
more generally, this section concentrates on surveillance systems in
particular, with specific attention paid to the types of control they exercise and
enable.
As a starting point, I define surveillance systems as those that enable control
of people through the identification, tracking, monitoring, and/or analysis of
individuals, data, or systems. Although surveillance hinges upon control, it
must be recognized that control is a loaded term that deserves to be unpacked.
The term control stands in, usually, as shorthand for “social control,” mean-
ing the mechanisms for ordering society through the regulation of individual
and group behavior. Manifestations of social control can be informal, such as
cultural norms and sanctions for improper behavior, or formal, such as laws
and state policing of deviance. Social control is usually perceived unfavorably
by critical social scientists because of the negative connotations associated with
hard forms of coercion and police discipline, which have been applied in highly
particularistic and discriminatory ways. Nonetheless, some form of social
control is necessary, and indeed inevitable, in societies, so the question should
be about what forms of control are more equitable, just, and democratic.
With surveillance, such analysis should begin by identifying the de facto
control regimes enforced by surveillance systems, whether intentionally or not,
and then move toward recommendations for control systems that are more
democratic in their design and effect.
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Two types of surveillance in particular directly challenge ideals of demo-
cratic governance. These are systems of differential control and automated
control, the effects of which are most egregious when the systems coexist or
are one and the same. Differential control can be witnessed first with the
“social sorting” functions of surveillance systems (Lyon, 2003, 2007). Surveil-
lance, in this regard, operates as a mechanism for societal differentiation; it
assists with discerning or actively constructing differences among populations
and then regulating those populations according to their assigned status
(Gandy, 2006; Haggerty and Ericson, 2006). The most obvious example of this
might be airport screening systems or “watchlists” for targeting people who
are thought to represent a higher risk of being terrorists and then subjecting
them to additional searches and interrogation, or simply precluding them from
flying altogether.
Because information technologies imbricate with most aspects of life and all
information technologies possess a surveillance modality, such practices of
social sorting manifest in many less obvious ways as well. For example, sur-
veillance-facilitated social sorting occurs with all kinds of status assignments
for access to basic services or needs, including transportation systems that
provide dedicated automobile lanes for those who can afford to pay while the
commuting needs of others are neglected (Graham and Marvin, 2001); energy-
provision services that offer convenient budget plans for “low-risk” groups
while others must contend with unforgiving pay-as-you-go plans with hefty
surcharges and penalties (Drakeford, 1995; Graham and Marvin, 2001); pre-
ferred-shopper programs that give elite shoppers handsome discounts based on
past purchases or preferences while intentionally overcharging for basic staple
goods more likely to be consumed by the poor (Albrecht and McIntyre, 2006;
Turow, 2006); and so on. As Minas Samatas aptly observes:
Political surveillance is not only that which is conducted by the state for
directly sociopolitical control purposes, but also the private, commercial,
consumer surveillance, which can sort individuals accordingly, by includ-
ing or excluding them, and affecting their life chances.
(Samatas, 2004:150)
If social equality and equal participation (or representation) in governance
processes are necessary conditions for strong democracy, then systems that
perpetuate social inequalities are antidemocratic. Whereas social sorting typi-
cally works through the differential application of the same technological sys-
tems to the governance of different populations, there are other ways that
surveillance can produce unequal outcomes. What I refer to as “marginalizing
surveillance” entails unequal exposure to different surveillance systems based
on one’s social address. More often than not, this means that some of the most
invasive systems of scrutiny and control are disproportionately applied to the
poor, to ethnic minorities, or to women. Mandatory drug testing for
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minimum-wage service employees or welfare recipients are particularly egre-
gious examples of marginalizing surveillance (Staples, 2000; Campbell, 2006).
Another example might be the surveillance of low-level employees with
keystroke-tracking software, global positioning systems, or radio-frequency
identification badges (EPIC and PI, 2000; Lyon, 2006). Rituals of extreme
technological and police surveillance of public-school students, especially in
lower-class minority neighborhoods, could be interpreted as another example
of marginalizing surveillance (Monahan and Torres, 2010). Those with
alternative social addresses, especially the relatively affluent, are largely insu-
lated from the degree and kind of surveillance represented by these cases. Such
surveillance does not simply regulate marginalized groups—it actively pro-
duces both identities and conditions of marginality. These marginalizing effects
might be more pronounced, in the eyes of subjects and objects of surveillance,
given the universalist and objective mythology surrounding all technological
systems, because discrimination can be masked behind the supposedly
impartial functions of “the system.”
The forms of differential control engendered by social sorting and margin-
alizing surveillance are both compounded and insulated by the automation of
surveillance functions. Automated control depends predominately upon algo-
rithmic surveillance systems, which take empirical phenomena—translated
into data—as their raw material, ranging from commercial purchases to
mobility flows to crime rates to insurance claims to personal identifiers.
Spaces, activities, people, and systems are then managed through
automated analysis of data and socio-technical intervention (Norris, Moran,
and Armstrong, 1998; Thrift and French, 2002; Graham and Wood, 2003).
Examples could include real-time management of traffic flows through the
identification and prioritization (and/or penalization) of some drivers, or
modes of transport, over others; integration of face-recognition software with
video surveillance systems so that positive “matches” with faces of suspected
terrorists, for instance, generate automatic alerts for security personnel; geo-
demographic mapping of reported crime incidents by neighborhood to create
risk-based response protocols for police; or automatic exclusion of individuals
from medical insurance coverage based on their genetic predisposition to
acquiring debilitating diseases.
Automated control systems share a predictive orientation toward people;
individual or group dispositions are rendered into statistical probabilities that
can be acted on in advance or in real time, usually for the sake of institutional
efficiency and commercial profit rather than social wellbeing. The systems seek
to fix identities in advance for more effective control, regardless of the ques-
tionable ethics associated with acting on predictions, or actualizing such pre-
dictions. Thus, an important ontological shift accompanies the transition to
automated surveillance practices. Whereas non-automated systems of social
control seek to identify and eliminate exceptions (i.e. to keep everyone in line
to ensure social cohesion), automated systems seek to verify conformity
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through processes of anticipatory inspection (Lianos and Douglas, 2000:269).
Everyone is presumed guilty, in a sense, until they pass preprogrammed
expectations for acceptable data. Of course, one should bear in mind that such
systems can be differentially applied as well; an added layer of automated
control can exist for “high risk” groups while “low risk” groups might bypass
such verification tests altogether.
It may be tempting to ascribe a totalizing force to automated systems and
make radical claims about the gradual elimination of trust relations, ethics,
and even culture under such systems (see, e.g., Lianos and Douglas, 2000).
Taking a cue from other STS scholars (e.g. Bijker and Law, 1992; Bowker and
Star, 1999), I find it more productive—and empirically accurate—to see such
systems as socially constructed, as embodying the values and cultural logics of
their contexts of production, as being thoroughly social even in their
cold technical rigidity. Moreover, while the systems may be increasingly auto-
mated, that does not preclude the necessity of their ongoing maintenance by
engineers, operators, programmers, and others; nor does it preclude active
negotiation, appropriation, and resistance by the targets of such surveillance.
Nonetheless, automated systems do resist participation, challenges, or alteration.
As with other non-democratic technological systems, exclusionary politics are
encoded in their design, enforced by bureaucratic structures of technical experts,
and propagated through the application of such systems to social settings.
These surveillance systems absorb and reproduce the dominant cultural
values of the contemporary political economy, most especially those associated
with neoliberalism. Neoliberalism is generally understood as an orientation
toward governance that emphasizes the privatization of public institutions and
the deregulation of industry (Harvey, 2005). Beyond that, however, neoliberal-
ism is a market rationale that colonizes most spheres of public life and trans-
forms their functions to prioritize economic gain over all other measures of
quality or success. From education, to health care, to transportation, to public
safety, neoliberal policies and practices have come to dominate public institu-
tions over the past few decades, in the United States and beyond (Duggan,
2003; Giroux, 2004). This shift in governance predictably pushes responsibility
onto individuals for what used to be the purview of the state, effectively
depoliticizing social problems and normalizing social inequalities (Brown,
2006). For example, if access to health care is seen as something that can be
chosen and purchased on the open market, instead of something that is a right,
then this relieves the state of responsibility for providing health care and
legitimates conditions of unequal access (Fisher, 2009). Moreover, there is a
disciplinary dimension to neoliberalism, whereby those who fail—or are
unable—to comply with the now-pervasive market logics are excluded or
criminalized in Darwinian fashion (Bourdieu, 1998; Garland, 2001; Simon,
2007). Therefore, existing social services, such as welfare programs, adopt
policing functions to spy on, punish, and exclude those who are already pre-
sumed guilty because they are poor (Gilliom, 2001; Eubanks, 2006). Conditions
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of economic insecurity, or the inability to meet one’s needs through consump-
tion, are suspect in this brave new neoliberal world.
Differential and automated control systems fuse with neoliberal rationalities
to further normalize conditions of social inequality and civic passivity, both of
which are antithetical to democratic principles. Social-sorting surveillance sys-
tems may have begun by separating out those who could pay for augmented
services from those receiving basic services, but they have quickly mutated into
schemes to reduce or eliminate basic services altogether, as evinced by the
reduction in staffed airport screening stations for non-elite travelers, the
reduction in lanes for cash-paying travelers at toll-road stations, or the reduc-
tion of public spaces and services more generally in lieu of surveillance-
controlled private zones for housing, commerce, education, health care, and so
on. If social sorting lends the appearance of providing incentives for differ-
ential treatment based on economic or other status or risk indicators, margin-
alizing surveillance threatens with disciplinary disincentives for those unable or
unwilling to compete in the neoliberal world. This helps to explain why the
most invasive and discriminatory forms of marginalizing surveillance focus
almost exclusively on the economically or politically disenfranchised, including
those who depend on state-supported health care, welfare, public education,
public transportation, and even those trying to access polling places in
communities with a preponderance of ethnic minorities. The automation of
these, and other, forms of differential surveillance depersonalizes instances of
discrimination and masks the exclusionary trends of neoliberalism more gen-
erally. Most concerning, perhaps, for this discussion about democracy is how
these systems might be contributing to the production of neoliberal subjects
who approach the world through the eyes of consumers rather than those of
citizens entitled to rights (Rose, 1999; Brown, 2006). Because the marketization
of public and private sectors eviscerates spaces for political debate, critique, or
action, it should not be much of a stretch to say that it similarly deflects and
delegitimizes any kind of critical democratic engagement with the mechanisms
of neoliberal control, including those of surveillance.
This section has revealed some of the technological politics behind modern
surveillance systems. Surveillance is predicated upon control. The dominant
manifestations of surveillance-based control today are disturbingly anti-
democratic because of the way they sort populations unequally, produce con-
ditions and identities of marginality, impinge upon the life chances of
marginalized populations, and normalize and fortify neoliberal world orders.
There are two main reasons to perceive such surveillance systems as anti-
democratic. First, surveillance technologies, like other technologies, act as
forms of legislation without much—if any—democratic participation or
representation. Second, perhaps as a direct result of the absence of democratic
processes with technology design and evaluation, social inequalities are aggra-
vated rather than ameliorated, which hinders the actualization of democratic
modes of associated living. Given the structural forces and constraints
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commented on in this section, even the apparent decentralization and diffusion
of surveillance systems, such as peer-to-peer surveillance, cannot be viewed as
democratizing because they do not in any way challenge structural inequalities
(Andrejevic, 2005). As with most technological systems, surveillance resists
public participation or critique by means of its opaque design and management
by technical experts, people who often prefer to hide or deny the surveillance
functions of the systems they oversee (Monahan, 2007). The question remains
as to whether surveillance could foster democracy rather than undermine it.
Democratic surveillance
What manifestations of surveillance support democracy? Control may be a
necessary and inevitable function of social regulation, but how can its enfor-
cement by surveillance technologies be more democratic and empowering for
more people? For the purpose of this inquiry, urban theorist Kevin Lynch
provides an instructive view of spatial control, which he posits as one of the
key criteria for good city design:
Control will sometimes enter a self-destructive spiral: perhaps down-
ward—as when behavior begins to escape any regulation and control
groups lose their confidence—or perhaps upward—as when a threatened
control progressively rigidifies, prescribing actions and rights more and
more minutely. These instabilities will also require intervention.
Once again, the ideal state of congruence must be balanced by external
regulation.
(Lynch, 1984: 212)
Critical social scientists, who usually write about the negative dimensions of
surveillance (and I include myself in this camp), may be doing a disservice to
progressive social change when they quickly equate social control with
disempowerment or oppression. What Kevin Lynch reminds us is that social
and spatial control require constant monitoring and regulation in order to
minimize oppressive tendencies and maximize empowering ones.
Perhaps it is obvious, but individually empowering, participatory, commu-
nity-based control mechanisms—the likes of which might be called strongly
democratic—flourish in small decentralized societies but are suppressed in
large centralized ones (Lynch, 1984:234; Illich, 1973). The same might be said
of technological systems: those that are locally based, small-scale, open-ended,
transparent, and participatory will be inherently more democratic and less
prone to abuse. Elsewhere I developed a parallel argument that surveillance
systems should be designed and regulated along these lines, to cultivate local
expertise and minimize problematic uses through transparent design, public
involvement, and local accountability (Monahan, 2006). Several problems
introduce themselves at this point, however. The first is that even strong
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democratic processes do not always produce democratic outcomes, so firm
criteria for evaluating new technological systems and preserving future demo-
cratic involvement must be included in any deliberation about or evaluation of
technology (Sclove, 1995). Legal scholar Lawrence Lessig compares such cri-
teria for technology infrastructure design to a constitutional framework.
A constitution—or information architecture, as the case may be—cannot hope
to stipulate all the rules for preserving democratic governance or predict in
advance the host of future threats it might face. What a constitution can do is
provide a set of guiding principles against which cases can be evaluated and
decisions can be made. Lessig writes:
We build a world where freedom can flourish not by removing society
from any self-conscious control; we build a world where freedom can
flourish by setting it in a place where a particular kind of self-conscious
control survives … I mean an architecture—not just a legal text but a way
of life—that structures and constrains social and legal power, to the end
of protecting fundamental values—principles and ideals that reach beyond
the compromises of ordinary politics.
(Lessig, 1999:5)
Because technology is most often perceived as political in its application but
apolitical in its design, and because technology production is most firmly
rooted in capitalist, free-market systems, the self-conscious establishment and
preservation of such democratic architectures will probably continue to
encounter serious resistance until such time as justice arguments can be merged
with capitalist imperatives. That said, the current popularity of open-source
software and growing interest in universal design may be harbingers of a phase
shift, or at least a moment of opportunity to move in this direction.
The second problem that must be addressed, or at least acknowledged,
concerns the influence of neoliberal structures and cultural logics upon the
social field for technological development and engagement. In this context,
even if transparency were achieved with the operation of surveillance systems,
it could easily be appropriated to support a highly limited, consumerist orien-
tation toward market “choices” instead of socially beneficial or community
empowering outcomes. One can see this clearly in the domain of pharmaceu-
tical drug marketing, for instance. A certain form of transparency is actualized
through direct-to-consumer advertising, allowing consumers to obtain knowl-
edge about drugs without having that information mediated by medical pro-
fessionals (Fisher and Ronald, forthcoming). In such situations, transparency
can actually reinforce a consumerist and individualist logic, which has little
room for democratic control, by implying that with adequate information,
consumers can make choices and vote with their dollars. A related problem
can be seen with the provision of information in the name of transparency
without accountability or any obvious mechanism to alter what is
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transparently extractive, exploitative, or otherwise problematic. Physician
conflict-of-interest statements or bank privacy statements (which might be
more accurately called “lack of privacy statements”) function in this way by
disclosing something that is unsavory without offering effective steps to miti-
gate it or real options to choose something different. In sum, transparency is
no substitute for deeper structural changes that include real power equaliza-
tion and serious accountability mechanisms.
At this stage, I would like to bracket these persistent (and important)
structural problems in order to discuss some concrete possibilities for demo-
cratic surveillance. Thus far, the argument has been that we need democratic
design processes and democratic criteria to regulate surveillance and other
technological systems (e.g. egalitarian participation, conviviality, structural
flexibility, and accountability). In addition to this, I would like to pursue the
idea that the most democratic and socially empowering designs (of spaces,
products, or technological systems) are those that work to correct power
asymmetries. Often these are designs that are explicitly intended to include
social groups that have been historically marginalized or discriminated against
by the built world, including women, the elderly, the young, the visually
impaired, the mobility impaired, and so on. It turns out that design for
marginalized populations often produces designs that are better for most
populations. For example, curb cuts in sidewalks or ramps up to buildings
may be intended for people in wheelchairs, but most people benefit from them:
people pushing strollers, people with canes or walkers, people on bicycles, and
so on. The same insight could be applied to the design of surveillance infra-
structures—to produce technological sensing and control devices that minimize
power asymmetries to the benefit of individuals and the empowerment of a
democratic citizenry.
The website Scorecard.org offers a compelling example of a surveillance
system with impressive democratic potential. This site serves as a clearing
house for information about releases of toxic chemicals and other con-
taminants in local neighborhoods (Fortun, 2004). It synthesizes “toxic release
inventory” data compiled by the United States federal government, along with
maps of “superfund sites,” lists of likely polluters in one’s neighborhood,
comparisons with pollution in other cities, and action items for direct public
involvement. It is a surveillance system in the sense that it manipulates data
for purposes of control, meaning, ideally, the policing of potential and actual
industrial polluters and the cleanup of toxic materials in one’s community.
While this is not a completely transparent, open, or participatory form of
surveillance, it is democratic in that it invites participation, fosters learning,
and affords a degree of power equalization among local communities and
institutions, be they industry or government.1
Related surveillance systems might actively monitor air, water, or noise
pollution and alert officials and communities to dangerous conditions. Artist
Tad Hirsch, for example, has implemented a system called “Tripwire” for
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sensing spikes in noise pollution in communities around airports and then
generating automated (and individualized) complaint messages to local gov-
ernment hotlines.2 The idea behind such complaint messages is that they must
be accounted for as “data” in official government documents and that a pre-
ponderance of them may require some kind of regulatory action. While this
system is even less participatory than Scorecard.org, it does represent another
qualified form of democratic surveillance because of its attention to power
equalization. It also points to opportunities for similar systems that could be
more democratic in their design, such as ones that disseminated the
data directly to the public or taught community members how to document
environmental problems in a more scientific way (see, e.g., Ottinger, 2005).
In a different vein, the development of pervasive computing environments
introduces other possibilities for democratic surveillance. For instance, in
collaboration with design schools, companies like Intel are sponsoring
experimental design projects for elderly care, with the idea of making older
people less dependent on (and controlled by) caregivers. Pervasive sensing sys-
tems might assist with daily functions like food preparation, communica-
tion, entertainment, or health monitoring. Whereas most of today’s technol-
ogies for elderly care seem to stress disciplinary forms of surveillance, such as
the use of wander guards and boundary alert units (which are systems
designed to prevent movement by the elderly beyond certain perimeters), by
shifting the user focus from caregivers to elderly populations, it is possible that
more liberating and demarginalizing designs might emerge (Kenner, 2008).
Designs for the elderly will likely be far more profitable for companies like
Intel too, especially given the growth in senior populations in countries like the
United States.
Obviously, such pervasive computing systems could be used by caregivers or
others to further reduce the agency of the elderly by better controlling their
daily activities, such as medication compliance or coffee consumption, for
instance. Pervasive computing systems could also easily become information-
extraction devices for marketing purposes. Therefore, in order for these sys-
tems to maintain their democratic orientation, safeguards would have to be
implemented to protect the privacy of the elderly, and to place control of the
technology in their hands. The risks for abuse may be high, but they do not
erase the potential for empowerment, which may best be preserved though the
active and ongoing negotiation of “shared protocols” by the primary stake-
holders (Galloway, 2004; Murakami Wood, 2007). Additionally, reflexive design
criteria could guide the design of pervasive environments to minimize their
repressive qualities and maximize their empowering ones (Phillips, 2005).
These might include basic tenets such as that the systems must be self-dis-
closing, default to harmlessness, preserve privacy, conserve time, and be deni-
able by users without any penalty (Greenfield, 2006).
It is important to recognize that in each of these examples democratic
surveillance relies on the work of technical experts, even as in its ideal form
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it encourages the development of technical literacy on the part of citizens.
Technical expertise, however, is reoriented—or appropriated, as the case may
be—away from instrumental logics of technical efficiency and toward broader
social goals. According to the philosopher of technology Andrew Feenberg
(1999), this reorientation is necessary in order to change the codes or archi-
tectures that shape technological practice over time, which is part of the
process toward that he calls “deep democracy.” Feenberg writes:
I will call a movement for democratization “deep” where it includes a
strategy combining the democratic rationalization of technical codes with
electoral controls on technical institutions … Deep democratization pro-
mises an alternative to technocracy. Instead of popular agency appearing
as an anomaly and an interference, it would be normalized and incorpo-
rated into the standard procedures of technical design.
(Feenberg, 1999:147)
Whether one calls them codes, infrastructures, protocols, or something else,
democratic technologies, including those of surveillance, hinge upon the
intentional harnessing of control to structure environments for empowerment.
Democratic codes are directed at achieving and preserving social goods beyond
the technocratic or capitalistic ones of efficiency and profitability.
Conclusion
This paper has explored some of the democratic pitfalls and potentials of
surveillance technologies. As a rule, contemporary surveillance systems are
antithetical to democratic ideals both in their design and application. They
individualize, objectify, and control people—often through their use of data—in
ways that perpetuate social inequalities; they obfuscate social contexts through
their lack of transparency; people are largely unaware of the functioning of
their systems, or of their rights; and they resist intervention through their
closed technical designs and management by technical experts or institutional
agents. Especially by shutting down avenues for meaningful participation (or
representation) in design processes that affect most people’s lives and by
aggravating social inequalities, surveillance systems threaten democracy. That
said, most large-scale technological systems are anti-democratic in their design
and effects, so surveillance technologies should not necessarily be viewed as
exceptional in this regard. What is important to note, however, is the perva-
siveness of surveillance systems and the intensification of their social-control
functions.
In theory, social control by technological means is desirable in advanced
industrialized societies because it actively reproduces values and norms neces-
sary for social cohesion but which are difficult to achieve in contexts of intense
geographical dispersion, cultural diversity, and social stratification. In practice,
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the surveillance functions of information systems tend to create and sustain
conditions of inequality and identities of marginality through their differential
application. For instance, surveillance as social sorting does not just discover
and act upon differences; it manufactures meaningful differences based on
particularistic indicators, such as wealth or skin color, and then excludes or
includes populations accordingly, thereby shaping individual experiences and
life-chances. David Lyon relates: “When people’s life-chances depend upon
what category they have been placed in, it is very important to know who
designed the categories, who defines their significance and who decides the
circumstances under which those categories will be decisive” (Lyon, 2007:186).
In spite of the proliferation of social sorting and marginalizing technologies,
most decisions about important categories or protocols are made by people far
removed from any formal mechanisms of democratic control, ranging from
city engineers to computer programmers to corporate managers.
What I call “marginalizing surveillance” takes social sorting to a more
explicit level of discrimination by selectively targeting those of lower social
status, usually the poor, for the most invasive forms of scrutiny and control.
The converse of this holds true as well. For instance, whereas the spending
habits of people on welfare might be tracked so that punitive measures can be
taken for any deviation from the rules, the spending habits of the relatively
affluent are tracked so that they can be rewarded for expensive purchases with
further discounts or special offers. The automation of surveillance then serves
to aggravate social inequalities by encoding into the systems neoliberal values
of institutional efficiency and commercial profit, often to the exclusion of
the social good. In addition to minimizing opportunities for democratic parti-
cipation, or even inquiry into surveillance practices, automated surveillance
destabilizes traditionally democratic beliefs in the possibility of achieving
social status; instead one’s value or risk is assigned in advance based on
statistical probabilities.
Democratic surveillance implies intentionally harnessing the control func-
tions of surveillance for social ends of fairness, justice, and equality. First,
more than simply using surveillance systems in different ways, democratic
surveillance involves reprogramming socio-technical codes to encourage trans-
parency, openness, participation, and accountability to produce new systems
and new configurations of experts and users, subjects and objects. Second,
because neither participation nor transparency is enough (for example, one can
willingly participate in one’s disempowerment, and exploitation can be made
transparent without allowing for change), democratic surveillance requires a
set of protocols or criteria against which to measure social value. The
shorthand that I offered is that democratic surveillance should lead to the
correction of power asymmetries. Because surveillance societies appear to be
here to stay, democratic ways of life may depend on tempering the growing
hegemony of differential and automated control with alternative, power-
equalizing forms of surveillance.
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1 Similar systems for disseminating information and inviting action might not neces-
sarily achieve democratic outcomes. For instance, one can imagine mapping systems
that alerted residents to “undesirable” people, such as registered sex offenders, living
in their neighborhoods. It is easy to imagine that such systems would be employed
to further marginalize or harass those people considered undesirable rather than
work to include them safely in community life.
2 http://web.media.mit.edu (accessed September 16, 2008).
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